In the UK, academic tenure in the American sense barely exists. Since the Education Reform Act (1988), universities have been able to dismiss academics not only for misconduct or incapacity, but also on grounds of redundancy. The grounds for redundancy in the UK are broader than those traditionally permitted under North American tenure. A permanent academic post is therefore not, in itself, a guarantee against dismissal if a university decides to cease or diminish the activity in which the academic is employed.

But this does not mean that all British academics enjoy the same degree of job insecurity. The crucial distinction is between universities in which senior management can drive redundancy decisions with relatively little institutional constraint and those in which academics retain meaningful constitutional power over them.

Oxford and Cambridge are exceptional because their governing arrangements preserve a formal role for their wider academic communities in authorising redundancies. At many other universities, governing bodies are dominated by senior managers and external members, while academics without managerial positions have little direct influence.

At Oxford, Congregation is the University’s sovereign body; at Cambridge, the Regent House has traditionally been understood as its governing body. These arrangements matter because they make redundancy more than a decision for university executives to take behind closed doors. They give academics a formal collective role in decisions that can determine whether colleagues lose their jobs and whether departments, disciplines or programmes survive.

Where such safeguards remain intact, the resulting job security can compare favourably with American tenure. The difference is not that Oxford and Cambridge are immune to financial pressure, but that their constitutional arrangements can constrain the exercise of unchecked managerial power.

Cambridge’s own description of the Regent House, its approach to member-initiated Graces and its handling of redundancy now demands closer scrutiny because of actions over the last year. The question is no longer simply whether Cambridge has better formal safeguards than many other British universities.

It is whether the University’s executive is prepared to respect the constitutional checks that make those safeguards meaningful.

Safeguards on paper, power in practice

The latest Cambridge University Reporter brings the issue into sharp focus. On 21 October 2026, the Council published a report seeking Regent House approval in principle for redundancies affecting three established academic-related offices at University Information Services (UIS). The report describes a service whose staffing has grown from 289 full-time-equivalent posts in 2021 to 428 in 2026, while annual operating costs have risen from £23.47 million to £42.73 million. The Council argues that restructuring is necessary to improve services and control costs. It also proposes cutting the user-centred design team from 22 staff to 11 and closing print and training services. These are management’s stated reasons, not proof that every proposed cut is justified.

But they make the central question unavoidable: who gets to decide, under what rules, and with what accountability to the people whose jobs are at stake?

Cambridge’s statutory protections are not decorative. The Council’s own report acknowledges that the redundancy process for established officers requires Regent House approval in principle, followed by a further report seeking approval for individual dismissals.

Yet the Thirty-first Report of the Board of Scrutiny, published in the same issue, raises a much more serious concern: the Council has increasingly treated member-initiated Graces as “advisory” or non-binding, even when those Graces have been authorised for submission to the Regent House. The Board says this practice appears constitutionally novel and recommends that the Council seek an authoritative interpretation of the Statutes. It also notes that the University’s own governance guide changed its description of the Regent House from “the University’s governing body” in November 2023 to “the University’s legislative and principal electoral body” in Easter Term 2025. These are not semantic quibbles. They go to the heart of who holds power at Cambridge.

The danger is obvious. If the Regent House is invoked when the University needs formal approval for redundancies, but its authority is qualified or disputed when its members try to influence policy, then self-government risks becoming a one-way street. The executive cannot credibly present the statutory process as a safeguard while simultaneously leaving unresolved whether the body participating in that process can exercise its constitutional powers effectively.

Nor is this concern confined to UIS. It affects everyone.

The Board’s criticism is especially pointed because it describes a wider problem of institutional accountability. It warns of a culture marked by insufficient challenge, limited participation, ineffective listening and diminishing trust. Its concern is not merely that governance procedures are complicated, but that the University’s increasingly centralised and complex structures may weaken the checks that are supposed to make decisions robust and legitimate.

Cambridge cannot have it both ways: it cannot celebrate the Regent House as a distinctive feature of academic self-government while allowing uncertainty to persist over whether its decisions bind the executive. If the Statutes are unclear, clarify them. If the Council believes that a Grace is non-binding, it must explain the legal basis openly and submit that interpretation to authoritative scrutiny. What is not acceptable is to treat constitutional accountability as optional whenever it becomes inconvenient.

Cambridge’s formal protections still distinguish it from universities where redundancy powers have been concentrated in senior management. Yet a safeguard is only as strong as the institution’s willingness to honour it. The Regent House must be more than a ceremonial electorate asked to endorse decisions already made elsewhere. If Cambridge’s academics want to enjoy exceptional protection from redundancy, they must ensure that the Regent House has real authority, that consultation can change outcomes, and that executive decisions can be challenged effectively. Otherwise, the University risks retaining the language of academic self-government while hollowing out its substance.

There is a coming storm.

We believe it is the responsibility of the Regent House rather than the Council to determine whether a department should be reduced in size.

Once the principle is conceded — that decisions of this magnitude belong to the executive, with the Regent House merely invited to ratify them — the constitutional protection becomes a formality. Today it may be UIS; tomorrow it may be a department, a research institute or an entire academic discipline.

The question is not whether Cambridge must adapt to financial pressures. It is whether those who bear the consequences of restructuring are entitled to a meaningful voice in deciding its course. If the Regent House relinquishes that responsibility now, it may find that, when the next crisis comes, there is little left to exercise.

(The image of storm clouds was taken by Tanjica Perovic, posted originally at https://flickr.com/photos/16251396@N06/5989630727. It is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic)