As Prof Wyn Evans has finally finished testifying, the background to the case can be given, using material disclosed in open court. This includes the witness statements of the Claimant (Prof Wyn Evans), the recent Kavli Prize winner (Prof Vasily Belokurov), the Shaw Prize Winner (Prof George Efstathiou), as well as Prof Martin Haehnelt and Dr Gudrun Tausch-Pebody. These witness statements are now in the public domain and may be quoted. There are available to read by signing up here.
The story of events at Cambridge University’s Institute of Astronomy (IoA) in 2021 need never have been made public. Prof Wyn Evans wanted matters resolved internally.
In 2023, there appeared a blog posting called the ‘Bullying of Hannelore‘ on the popular astronomy website ‘In the Dark‘ run by Prof Peter Coles. It describes what happened at the IoA in 2021. ‘Hannelore’ can now be named (with her permission) as Dr Gudrun Tausch-Pebody.
It has always been Prof Wyn Evans’ position that the name of the Professor at the centre of the bullying allegations is not important. Here we will call him Prof A. What is important is the institutional response to the disclosures of alleged serious bullying by Prof A made by Profs Wyn Evans (and Martin Haehnelt).
Prof Wyn Evans alerted the Head of School (Prof Nigel Peake, Master Elect of Darwin College) and the then Deputy Directors (Profs Chris Reynolds and Anthony Challinor) through a number of disclosures, including an email and a document called ‘the Delays Document’. These are also now in the public domain available by sign-up. A redacted and slightly shortened version of the email to Prof Peake is below.
Dear Nigel Peake,
I am writing to you because I am very concerned about Gudrun Pebody. She seems to me to be in a fragile state of mind. (We have been interacting a lot over the examinations and the ORP grant).
She is a valuable member of staff at the Institute of Astronomy, and of course we owe her a duty of care — as we do for all our Cambridge colleagues. Gudrun believes that [REDACTED] is trying to make her unemployed.
She has good reason. There is indeed overwhelming evidence that Prof A is planning to make her unemployed, as part of a personal vendetta.
Regrettably, the IoA has a terrible record of support for female administrative staff. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] was hounded out a job (the Department had to pay her compensation). [REDACTED] also came to believe that Prof A was trying to sack her & left a frightened woman. [REDACTED].
There is a bad history of misogyny to female administrators at the top of the IoA. I am terrified of history repeating itself here.
Perhaps this is out of an abundance of caution, but in these matters, it is better to be cautious … and compassionate.
Best Wyn Evans
Cambridge University’s Whistleblowing policy is given here.
An external review of the matter by an external barrister, Mr Jeremy Scott-Joynt, concluded that the actions of Prof Wyn Evans amounted to whistleblowing as there was “a risk to the health or safety of any individual“. There are multiple independent statements that allege an emergency had arisen at the IoA by July 2021 because of the treatment of Dr Tausch-Pebody by Prof A.
Whistleblowers are protected under the Employment Act (1996) from retaliation or other detriments. Prof Evans’ alleges that he was retaliated against by Prof A and the University, including the School of Physical Sciences Human Resources (HR) division. This is led by Ms Louise Akroyd.
It is not disputed that Prof A raised a Grievance against Prof Evans (and two other Professors at the IoA). It is agreed that Prof A’s Grievance made a series of claims unsupported by any evidence. It was advanced to the formal stage by Prof Peake and investigated by Mr Scott-Joynt. After nearly two years, the University concluded that no evidence had been provided.
After a year had elapsed with no sign of Cambridge University’s investigation into him ending, Prof Evans hired solicitors who wrote to Prof A asking him to withdraw his allegations. Prof A refused.
Prof Wyn Evans then took legal action (defamation) against Prof A. This ended with Prof A conceding that his allegations against Wyn Evans were untrue. Prof A’s legal expenses were supported via the University’s insurance policy (wholly or partially) throughout this matter.
Prof Evans alleges that he was severely victimised by making protected disclosures, as the University subjected him to a lengthy investigation into a matter could quickly have been established as groundless. Further, he alleged that the University has failed in its duty of care to protect the mental health of a number of members of staff at the IoA, and especially Dr Gudrun Tausch-Pebody, Profs Wyn Evans, Martin Haehnelt and Prof A.
The University’s defence of its actions eventually involved the former Registrary (Emma Rampton) and the current Vice Chancellor (Prof Deborah Prentice) in the matter.
(Although Prof A’s name is in the public domain, we ask that you do not identify him. We appreciate Dr Tausch-Pebody’s bravery in allowing herself to be named).
32 Comments
- · 13 June 2026 at 06:52
This is word for word what happened in several other departments at the same time.
Anonymous · 13 June 2026 at 14:34
Actually, an eerily similar pattern of behaviour is still being played out in at least one Department (happening right now).
TheResearcher · 13 June 2026 at 07:10
Thank you for the background update.
Thank you in particular for finally mentioning the name of the Lead HR Business Partner of the School of Physical Sciences. Please let us know when she will be cross examined in due course. Every member of this School should watch her cross examination, namely if they intend to interact with her in the future.
Thank you again to Wyn Evans and his lawyers, but also to his witnesses, namely Dr Tausch-Pebody, for their bravery and for exposing their experiences that reflect the state of Cambridge University when it comes to addressing reports of misconduct.
Wyn Evans and his witnesses are welcome to mention my name and my experience in tribunal if necessary. Several of the actors are the same. As I noted in the previous post, I’m fully responsible for my comments on this blog, and my identity is well known.
XX · 13 June 2026 at 07:27
In Physics, well-known that there are very serious problems with the School of Physical Sciences HR.
SPARTACUS · 13 June 2026 at 09:50
This is just an example of how UCam works as explained here many times. The difference is Wyn Evans decided to fight the oligarchy. This is why it got all the way to ET and why the strategy of the oligarchy legal team is to destroy the credibility of Prof Evans. The problem for the oligarchy is that a judge is deciding what can be seen by everybody. The University has already lost.
Redux · 13 June 2026 at 12:05
2024
As far as I can tell it is certainly a bit better in some of the hard sciences and actually some of the rest of social sciences, I mean it is more humanities that is the disaster zone, all that bitterness and fighting you know just for crumbs. History you know, POLIS too. Judge of course got themselves out of that by setting up into new school entirely. Has to be a totally new school. But seriously if you know the stuff in astrophysics and cancer research right now it is bad. Really bad. Maybe there are a couple of schools where it is I would say ok, ok-ish, but generally I think what keeps it alive is the links outside to government and industry, for the B school or compsci. Anyway it’s obvious now this goes to the top.
But that’s also a very British thing this appalling management culture and somehow you have bright and talented people who struggle through and suffer [in] silence. My friends at the beeb say exactly the same thing about how it is there and some parts of UK government are the same. But ok obviously we both know [ ] is especially bad. Since you left there’s a bunch more cases in preparation. I think we could see 5-10 more cases this year in one school. So what is the plan, how far does this go now?
I think the plan is something like, if they allow all this come to a head, then VC has to have to fire five or six people. I mean, yeah. I don’t see any other way.
[pause] (hard swallow) [pause].
TheResearcher · 13 June 2026 at 12:15
It is my understanding from what was said in open court that Prof. Peake will continue to be cross examined on Monday. 21 Group, is it possible to know and advertise when Ms Akroyd will be cross examined? It is of public interest. I intend to call Prof Peake & Ms Akroyd as witnesses in my case because they were directly involved in it, and I encourage all the members of the School of Physical Science and Darwin College to listen to the hearings.
I should add that I found it very concerning that the University’s Barrister forgot to mention that Wyn Evans was not the only one to contact Darwin College about Prof. Peake. I also contacted Darwin College and cc-ed Prof. Peake. This was done after I contacted Prof. Peake directly asking if he had reported conflicts of interest and he did not reply to me.
On a different note, all Proctors, all Pro-Proctors and all Deputy Proctors, refused to be part of the Appeal Committee regarding my expulsion as a Cambridge Student, while the Student Complaint Procedure explicitly states that one of them needs to be part of the Committee. You would think that this alone would be sufficient to appoint an external panel as I asked, but the University continues to resist that idea….
XX · 13 June 2026 at 12:16
I don’t see how they cope with all these scandals, it’s been a bad year already. I suspect it’s more likely that the VC will go back to Princeton than fire five or six people.
Committtee · 13 June 2026 at 12:52
There’s an internal document showing they were fully aware of the scale of the problems across the entire university, so they thought about shifting some cost burden down to the schools and departments causing all the mess. Make them more liable for the legal burden. But it hasn’t really changed things because the covering up remains in place. And that’s nothing to do with Wyn’s case either, all this one is a drop in the ocean compared to the river still flowing.
Priorities · 13 June 2026 at 13:26
Definitely worth an FOI request if you can give a bit more detail about the document.
In the meantime here’s the indicative cost estimate I received from a comparable case:
Cost Estimate (4 week ET case)
1. KC (brief fee and 4 week daily rate) £100,000 – £165,000
2. Junior counsel (1 senior junior; +1 optional) £58,000 – £140,000
3. Room & board (28 nights, ~3 people) £18,000 – £38,000
4. Subtotal (counsel + lodging) £176,000 – £343,000
5. Instructing solicitors £40,000 – £165,000+
6. VAT @ 20% £45,200 – +£88,600
Total – £300,000 – £600,000
Not sure loss of first week brings the figure down but either way we are looking at say quarter to half million pounds on that, then if they are bringing in PR and all the rest you can adjust upwards again, and as for costs to date in litigating this thing out, well we have an idea from the High Court what that was plus 4 years of extra solicitor fees too. Easily millions.
Jay · 13 June 2026 at 13:38
How much will all the CRUK scandals cost the University?
AntiQ · 13 June 2026 at 14:11
It will be a large sum of money.
At UK employers, the standard method of insurance coverage for tribunal cases is via Employment Practices Liability Insurance (EPLI). However, the status of any EPLI policy at Cambridge is not detailed in public accounts.
For reference, the general practice at large Higher Education bodies is not to assume an EPLI but rather to “self-insure”. This is a euphemistic way to express that costs are paid out-of-pocket from internal resources (student fees, endowment, or undisclosed off-balance sheet accounts). The magnitude of any such fund, how it is resourced, and who manages it, have not been disclosed to date.
EPLI also operates under strict conditions. For example, voluntary settlements are typically not covered by such a policy, only the cost of escalating litigation.
For some categories of cases I understand that the university holds a University Insurance Programme arranged annually with sector insurers, split into sections: Employers’ Liability (£25m), Public Liability (£50m, now via Zurich Municipal, policy NHE-19CA01-0013), Professional Indemnity (£10m) and Personal Indemnity. Zurich Municipal is the UK public-sector arm of Zurich Insurance. The policy would likely not cover ET cases. A copy of the policy document has not been disclosed to public.
In addition the policy only applies under certain conditions: under the Insurance Act 2015) claims are invalid following a failure to make a fair presentation of the risk to insurers. It also cannot cover intentional acts nor those made in in bad faith nor circumstances in which the policyholder has made any admission of liability prior to informing the insurer. Failure to meet these criteria would result in a claim being ruled as invalid.
These observations are made in respect of general university policies based on existing public information and in response to questions raised in regards to general financial management at UK registered charities.
Anon · 14 June 2026 at 08:19
No insurer would agree to costs like that. Who signed off within the university and what is the budget code? Surely Council is supposed to have oversight.
despair · 14 June 2026 at 10:16
But Rampton is no longer a member of the university right? I thought she left last year, so why would Council approve spending this kind of money in order to protect a third party outside of the university, and from allegations brought by a member?
Autogolpe · 15 June 2026 at 05:47
Membership of the cartel does not require actually holding office at the university. As long as your friends can squeeze decisions through or around Council you will always be covered by its resources.
101 · 15 June 2026 at 08:33
Autogolpe, I think you mean “our” resources. I don’t know if this is a good moment you remind the community that the university body (regent house) voted to disclose the list of major donors to the university / charity and council flat-out refused to comply with the vote.
confused · 14 June 2026 at 10:38
Where are ad hoc legal costs reported in the annual accounts?
Mysterian · 14 June 2026 at 20:08
Does anyone know?
We’d really like to know the answer to this. Where are all these mammoth costs buried?
No Comment · 14 June 2026 at 20:26
Thank you for your question.
The answer to your question is that the costs are not disclosed, rather, litigation defence costs are coded as ordinary operating expenditure that gets absorbed into aggregate lines (chiefly “Other operating expenses”). So in Cambridge’s 2024-25 accounts, defence spend on any ET or High Court matter is part of the £1,225m “Other operating expenses” figure. As noted elsewhere this figure has risen by 50% in recent years, and likely includes cost overrun in a wider variety of areas, including IT costs, consultancy contracts, and growth in administrative spend.
The common argument to exclude disclosure of such amounts is that of “materiality” i.e. that the figures are small relative to overall cost base. However, the materiality exception is is likely contestable in this case. If the University is engaged in austerity (5% department cutbacks, and even closures, such as that proposed for the Veterinary Department), on the grounds of the core university deficit widening from -£47m to -£105m, and litigation expenditure forms a significant contributor to that deficit, it can no longer be sustained that the expense is not “material”, as this evidences a clear understanding of materiality as per the management’s own interpretation of that term.
The same is true of all other material contributors to the widening deficit, whatever their cause or true origin may be.
? · 13 June 2026 at 14:40
I really don’t know how this ends now. I kind of feel it has got to this point where there are no easy options any more. Definitely no good options. There might have been some late moves to change course, who knows, but no one was acting in good faith so they have really been sailing blind I think.
Anonymous · 13 June 2026 at 15:12
In my opinion (and generally speaking), this is a deliberate strategy, i.e. what starts off as a complaint against a single individual (especially senior managers or HR), ends up as a full, blatant and brutal attack on the whistleblower involving many senior managers and HR, thus dispersing the problem widely.
It quickly gets to the point where so many managers and HR staff would need to be dismissed that it then becomes weaponised as a defence for the University concerned (‘surely this many experienced individuals cannot be wrong or have it in for you, all at the same time (?), come on now, it’s all in your head’, etc etc).
Well, there is an on-going case, in a different institution, where the whistleblower was told *in writing* that many individuals across the University will need to be dismissed (based on the complaints and evidence raised by the whistleblower), so the whistleblower must be dismissed instead (to make that problem go away). This is no joke (and it gets *much* worse – more soon). The question must be asked why these individuals would be so bold.
!!! · 15 June 2026 at 06:27
@Anonymous
The flaw in that logic is that several people already resigned on grounds of conscience – and they weren’t even centrally involved! If they felt it was right to do so … what grounds can those at the heart of the affair offer not to leave as well?
Eileen Nugent · 15 June 2026 at 03:18
I think a high level of care needs to be taken if analysing one of these situations which has both an employment dimension and a health and safety dimension in the UK in terms of whether people are acting in good faith or in bad faith.
I think a significant part of the problem in the UK is that the employment culture is grounded in employers estimating the financial risk of employment law violations and taking employment decisions not solely on the basis of employment law compliance but also on the basis of the financial risk associated with employment law non-compliance. The current employment culture could be said to be an absence-of-good-faith employment culture and one of the groups most at risk in this absence-of-good-faith employment culture is the group of people employed on temporary contracts including fixed-term contracts. As a result of the prevalence of this absence-of-good-faith employment culture in the UK, in analysing these situations with an employment dimension and a health and safety dimension it is necessary to separate out the employment actions – that are being influenced by the absence-of-good-faith employment culture present in the UK – and the health and safety actions.
I can’t comment on other other cases including the one above. In my case I felt the university understood the employment situation before any health and safety situation was at play and that there was an absence of good faith in the employment situation when no health and safety situation was at play. The university appointed a person to a university lectureship role on a fixed-term contract who it would not have appointed to that role had it been seeking to appoint a person to the same role on a permanent basis. The university then took whatever employment actions it deemed necessary during that fixed-term contract to get what it judged to be the right employment outcome for the university at the end of that fixed-term contract regardless of whether the employment actions were in compliance with employment law. This is an absence-of-acting-in-good-faith employment culture. The absence of good faith is not the same as bad faith.
Once the health and safety situation arose I felt the university didn’t understand the health and safety situation and that people applied thinking to the health and safety situation that had no realistic prospect of effectively managing the health and safety situation or resolving the health and safety situation. This is different to people acting in bad faith in a situation. I felt that people needed to do significant amounts of learning in that health and safety situation to allow thinking to emerge that would enable effective handling and a swifter resolution of that type of health and safety situation.
I think most universities in the UK are in the exact same position with respect to these issues, all having become overly reliant on an absence-of-acting-good-faith employment culture which has lead to the proliferation of sub-standard employment practices. The problem with the absence of good faith state is that it is an intermediate state between a good faith state and a bad faith state which has the potential to swing either way, back towards a sustainable good faith state or on towards an unsustainable bad faith state.
There are no easy options, there are no quick fixes for two main reasons :
(i) Employment culture in the UK would need to shift away from payments for employment law non-compliance towards higher levels of employment law compliance. The culture of payments for employment law non-compliance means that employment law has not been forced to continuously evolve to maintain itself in a state where the right balance is continuously being struck between employers and workers to maximise the number of mutually beneficial working relationships being maintained in the UK at any point in time. The current state is play is that financial payments are being made to hold poorly functioning employment law in place and/or to hold employers in a poorly functioning state as employers.
(ii) The transition to having to think in terms of work-related stress regulation and mental health risk in employment is a difficult transition to have to make. If work-related stress regulation and mental health risk is not taken seriously enough there is insufficient action because there is insufficient pressure to take any action but if work-related stress regulation is taken too seriously this can lead to paralysis in which case there is then insufficient action because there is too much pressure. Both extremes lead to excess health and safety risk, increased work-related ill health and poorer organisational function.
I think what tends to happen if a person is confronted with a new health and safety risk is that there are oscillations of how seriously the person takes the new health and safety risk while the person is actively learning about that health and safety risk until a person settles into a final state of seriousness with which they take that health and safety risk which will vary from person to person. Some people are more accurate in their estimation of health and safety risk than others because some people have more information to play with in relation to a particular health and safety risk and/or are willing to put more effort into learning about a particular health and safety risk. This means the mental kinetics of the seriousness oscillations will vary from person to person in addition to the final state of seriousness varying.
Being confronted with a new health and safety risk can lead to a rollercoaster of emotions/reactions in relation to a health and safety risk while people are actively learning about that health and safety risk. Since work-related stress regulation and mental health risk is a complex health and safety risk the range of emotions/reactions possible during the seriousness oscillations when actively learning about that particular health and safety risk it is extremely broad, some of the emotions/reactions possible are extreme and may be incomprehensible to others and even to the person themselves, it is possible for a person to flip from taking the health and safety risk extremely seriously to not taking it at all seriously and back to taking it extremely seriously again in extremely short timescales.
I think one of the more significant barriers to people understanding work-related stress regulation and mental health risk is this: a person will have to confront some very difficult questions on suicide risk in relation to both their own self and in relation to others. This may be very difficult for a person to do without generating significant conflicts with their own existing set of personal beliefs.
In terms of that particular barrier I think it is possible to think about suicide risk in a rational way, one which minimises the risk of generating significant conflicts with any existing personal beliefs whatever those existing personal beliefs happen to be. Suicide can be seen as an option that the mind may make available to a person for a conscious decision in a particular situation. The probability of this happening is influenced both by the evolution of the physical/metabolic health of a persons mind – physical resources available to the mind – and also by a persons psycho-social life journey – challenges the mind faces.
Physical/metabolic health instabilities of the mind are possible in the absence of psycho-social instabilities or psycho-social instabilities are possible in the absence of physical/metabolic health instabilities of the mind. Either can lead to the mind presenting the option of suicide to the person for conscious decision but physical/metabolic instabilities of the mind are more likely to generate conscious decision impulses where the option of suicide is presented by the mind to the person for conscious decision suddenly & forcefully for a short amount of time before being withdrawn just as suddenly. A person can find themselves at the mercy of physical/metabolic instabilities of the mind driving wave after wave of these conscious decision impulses. A person can be forced to swim in internal mental seas of unfathomable mental turbulence. The highest risk is the presence of physical/metabolic health instabilities in the face of psycho-social instabilities.
Typically the mind is able to maintains itself in a state where the option of suicide is not available to a person for conscious decision. A person could go through their entire life without a persons mind ever having made the option of suicide available to the person for conscious decision.
Forecaster · 13 June 2026 at 15:04
If people are surprised by what is happening in Cambridge University in 2026, they most likely did not realize the link between Cambridge University and Consigliere University and the forecasting made last December. Remember, the year of the Snake is over!
https://21percent.org/?p=3097
TheResearcher · 13 June 2026 at 16:44
Literally 1 year ago… “One cancer researcher who recently left the University told The Observer that they had been ‘intimidated, harassed, and bullied'”
https://www.varsity.co.uk/news/29483
Lord Smith won the race. What is he doing now? We all know the answer, and it is embarrassing!
Xerxes · 13 June 2026 at 16:52
A number of victims of bullying have spoken to him. He has done nothing.
Whatever he thinks the job of Chancellor is, it doesn’t involve fixing things. He’s been a disappointment.
MUSKETEER · 13 June 2026 at 19:12
Agreed! The oligarchy controls him. American Queen will continue to decimate UCam for £570,000 per anum.
SK · 13 June 2026 at 19:19
For people who do not have access to the proceedings, there is also a useful document published by the defamation lawyer firm https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Evans-v-McMahon-Approved-Judgment-24.03.2023-V1.pdf
It has some useful additional background.
No Comment · 14 June 2026 at 09:42
If Council did not approve decisions on high cost litigation this would mark a serious breach of the University’s regulatory principles. I refer here primarily in reference to debates over decisions made in 2025 approved by the “Gold Team” without apparent Council consultation; whether applicable to broader contexts is a matter for the University Trustees to evaluate.
1. First, as an exempt Charity, Cambridge is regulated by the Office for Students: “The University of Cambridge is an exempt charity subject to regulation by the Office for Students (OfS) under the Charities Act 2011”.
2. The OfS guidelines clearly stipulate that trustees must “ensure… that its assets are applied solely for its charitable purposes”.
3. Under its Charity status with OfS, the University Council constitutes the “charity trustees”. As per the University’s own Council Handbook: “In accordance with Section 177 of the Charities Act 2011, Council members are the University’s trustees… Charity trustees are bound by the same fiduciary and related duties as the law imposes on all trustees”. This confirms that there is a duty to ensure that Council as a whole are fully informed of such decisions, and given authority to approve or deny any such decisions.
4. In the exercise of this guidance, a key provision is that officers of the University do not place their personal interests above those of the charitable mandate, nor deceive the trustees (the Council) while doing so.
This is clearly stiplated by the University itself (members “should not profit from the University and should avoid any conflict between their own interests… and those of the University. Any actual or potential conflict of interest should be declared and handled in accordance with… the University’s Conflict of Interest Policy”). Allocation of charitable funds in a manner intended to benefit or protect an individual officer or officers over delivery of its mandated goals may qualify as conflict of interest under this provision.
5. The general law (Trustee Act 2000, s.1 statutory duty of care) and Charity Commission CC3 also require trustees to take proper advice and refrain from disproportionate spending of weak or bad faith legal cases. This advice must be given to the trustees – the University Council – and not any other entity. It must come from parties who are themselves without conflict of interest. Responsibility cannot be sub-delegated (e.g. as per 2025 “Gold Team” controversy).
6. The OfS also includes clear provisions under initial condition E7 that require “adequate and effective” arrangements to “prevent, detect and stop fraud and the inappropriate use of public funds”. Examples of such failure would include failure to have sought trustee (Council) approval prior to legal action (for example the 2025 High Court Case, allegedly at a 1.4m cost in legal fees)
Consequences of Compliance Failure
This is the key part:
1. A key provision of misallocation of funds as per (1-6) above is that there must be personal liability for any losses.
The Charity Commission guidelines specify unambiguously: “Trustees who act in breach of their legal duties can be held responsible for consequences that flow from such a breach and for any loss the charity incurs”; and “spending charity funds on the wrong purposes is a very serious matter; in some cases trustees may have to reimburse the charity personally”.
2. Even though Cambridge is an exempt charity it can still be investigated in full by the Charity Commission and the rule applied.
All that is required is that the Charity Commission first obtain consent from the OfS (GOV.UK CC23 states that an exempt charity “may only be investigated by the Commission as part of a statutory inquiry at the request of its principal regulator”), but given the encompassing authority of the Commission this would unlikely be denied on presentation of relevant grounds for concern.
3. Such grounds may be bolstered via recourse to the Freedom of Information Act 2000, as Cambridge is a public authority for FOIA. A simple request to foi@admin.cam.ac.uk would ask (i) total external legal spend on employment-tribunal and High Court litigation by year, (ii) aggregate settlement values, (iii) any litigation provisions in management accounts.
Any attempt to withhold information may be mitigated by precedent (e.g. a Varsity FOI which extracted the total cost of student-complaint payouts 2019-24).
Any refusal on cost of processing may be vitiated by making itemised requests that situate clearly within processing times or compliance expenses, and failure to comply at this stage may provide further evidence of bad faith in any subsequent investigation.
TheResearcher · 14 June 2026 at 10:36
The “University’s Conflict of Interest Policy”?!??! Cambridge University has one of this and follows it? If you could post this policy here, I would really appreciate it. I was recurrently told that conflicts of interest were in my head. When I asked the policy and working definition of conflicts of interest, I was invariable ignored. Many UCam members experienced the same.
The Council is full of people like Lord Glossover (https://21percent.org/?p=2655). There is always some excuse for not acting, for not seeing the evidence, for looking the other way. All members of Council know what the University did to me, and only 1 tried to help me.
AntiQ · 15 June 2026 at 11:14
A brief comment on the matter of legal insurance policy and criteria for coverage, as this has been referenced earlier in this and preceding threads. This is a summary of public information and not personal advice or a suggestion to engage in any particular action, nor does it pertain to any individual allegation of insurance claim misconduct. It may have particular relevance to Cambridge, but also, likely applies to other universities across the sector.
Under the Insurance Act 2015, the insured must make a “fair presentation of the risk” and disclose every material circumstance it knows or ought to know. A material non-disclosure or misrepresentation gives the insurer remedies: including, if deliberate or reckless, avoiding the policy and keeping the premium, and refusing any claim.
Insurers actively invite third-party fraud/irregularity reports. Zurich’s own policy wording states it shares information “with other organisations including… the police, the Insurance Fraud Bureau (IFB), other insurers” and that false/inaccurate information will be “investigated and appropriate action taken,” potentially referred to the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED).
A disclosure that the University has misrepresented to, or withheld material information from, its insurer can be a qualifying disclosure under s.43B ERA 1996: most obviously tending to show a criminal offence, a breach of a legal obligation (the duty of fair presentation; fiduciary/charity duties), or the deliberate concealment of any of these — provided you hold a reasonable belief it is substantially true and in the public interest (the public-interest test from Chesterton v Nurmohamed
EWCA Civ 979).
Routes for Disclosure
1. First, the principal regulator is the Office for Students, and has a statutory duty to promote trustees’ compliance with charity law and can approve the Charity Commission to open a statutory inquiry. This would form a protected disclosure under the University’s whistleblowing policy.
2. Second, the cross-industry route for reporting suspected insurance fraud in the UK is via the hotline at 0800 422 0421 or online on their website. The regulators accept reports in confidence and allows anonymity, then issues alerts to insurers, further regulators and law enforcement where appropriate. This route offers the greatest safety due to strong anonymity protections.
3. Third, if what you have suggests a criminal dimension (e.g. dishonest misrepresentation to obtain an indemnity), the police channel is Action Fraud 0300 123 2040. This should be done only after option (1) above and/or if on the basis of strong grounds for concern.
Any failure by preceding parties in the disclosure chain (the OfS, insurer agents, or broader regulators) would be taken seriously by higher investigators.
The Cambridge Whistleblowing Saga | In the Dark · 15 June 2026 at 11:54
[…] evidence, it is now possible to release some of the background publicly. You can read a summary here. If you follow that link you will see reference to this guest post, published on this blog in late […]