{"id":3647,"date":"2026-05-16T12:22:06","date_gmt":"2026-05-16T11:22:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/?p=3647"},"modified":"2026-05-16T13:18:29","modified_gmt":"2026-05-16T12:18:29","slug":"wanted-for-destruction-of-a-world-class-university","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/?p=3647","title":{"rendered":"WANTED — For Destruction of A World Class University"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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From top left, clockwise: Karen Cox, Shearer West, Paul Greatrix, Margaret Monckton<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This week saw the horrible news <\/a>that Nottingham University sent letters to 2,700 staff putting them at risk of redundancy. The university is targeting subjects and departments with low staff-to-student ratios, specifically including physics, medicine, health sciences, modern languages, history and music. This is being carried out under the present Vice Chancellor, Jane Norman<\/a>, and her senior leadership team. Job cuts in universities have long targeted arts, humanities & social sciences. Actions at Nottingham clearly show that \u201cblue skies\u201d science is next. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who is responsible for the financial distress that Nottingham finds itself in?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The financial crisis stems from poor decisions under the previous Vice Chancellor Shearer West<\/strong>. The guilty people have all moved onward & upward, leaving the present staff facing consequences of poor management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The financial problems are closely tied to a major property expansion strategy that went badly wrong. A central example is the Castle Meadow campus<\/a>, which the university bought in 2021 for around \u00a337.5 million and then spent tens of millions more refurbishing, bringing the total investment to roughly \u00a380 million. The aim was to create a flagship city-centre site focused on business links and research partnerships, expanding the university\u2019s presence beyond its existing campuses, predominantly in Beeston.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, within a few years the value of the site dropped dramatically, forcing a write-down of tens of millions of pounds and contributing heavily to the deficit. The situation became particularly stark when, shortly after the campus fully opened, the university began trying to sell it, having concluded that the costs of running such a large estate were unsustainable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The university had assumed continued growth in student numbers and stable income, especially from international fees, and invested heavily in buildings on that basis. When those assumptions failed, it was left with high fixed costs tied up in physical assets that could not easily generate returns. At the same time, Nottingham already operated multiple large campuses, so adding another major site increased complexity and ongoing maintenance costs without matching demand. This is an elementary financial misjudgement, for which the then Registrar (Paul Greatrix<\/strong>) and Chief Financial Officer (Margaret Monckton<\/strong>) must bear some of the blame.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alongside the property strategy, there was also a\u00a0problematic and costly IT programme<\/a>. Nottingham attempted a large-scale transformation of its digital and administrative systems. The aim was to modernise everything from finance and HR to student administration, replacing older systems with a unified platform. However, the project ran into major difficulties. It became significantly\u00a0over-budget and delayed, with implementation problems disrupting core university operations. Staff struggled with new systems that were not properly bedded in, leading to inefficiencies, workarounds and a loss of confidence in the rollout. This was overseen by the then Deputy Vice Chancellor, Karen Cox<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like the property expansion, the IT programme reflected the same underlying issue: a belief that large upfront investment in infrastructure would deliver long-term efficiency gains. Instead, costs escalated, delivery was messy, and the expected benefits were delayed or not fully realised. Combined with the property write-downs and income pressures, it became another strand in a wider pattern of over-ambitious expansion and weak financial resilience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where are the people who presided over these catastrophic decisions?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shearer West<\/a><\/strong>  was Vice Chancellor at the University of Nottingham from  2017 to 2024. She joined the University of Leeds as Vice Chancellor on 1 November 2024. Her current salary is listed as \u00a3338,250.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Karen Cox<\/a><\/strong> left Nottingham to become Vice Chancellor of the University of Kent<\/a> on August 2017. As Kent’s financial position also became increasingly precarious, she resigned on May 2024. In February 2026, the near-bankrupt University of Kent legally committed to merging with the University of Greenwich, as reported here<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paul Greatrix<\/a><\/strong> spent 18 years as Registrar of the University of Nottingham, leaving in August 2025 to become Director of Higher Education Consultancy at the law firm Shakespeare Martineau. They act as ‘insurance lawyers’ for many universities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Margaret Monckton<\/strong> <\/a>was Chief Financial Officer at Nottingham for eight years, leaving in December 2024. She is now Chief Financial Officer for Great Ormond Street Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

From top left, clockwise: Karen Cox, Shearer West, Paul Greatrix, Margaret Monckton This week saw the horrible news that Nottingham University sent letters to 2,700 staff putting them at risk of redundancy. The university is targeting subjects and departments with low staff-to-student ratios, specifically including physics, medicine, health sciences, modern languages, history and music. This […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3647","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3647","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3647"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3647\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3659,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3647\/revisions\/3659"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3647"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3647"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3647"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}