{"id":3186,"date":"2026-02-04T20:19:19","date_gmt":"2026-02-04T20:19:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/?p=3186"},"modified":"2026-02-05T14:27:50","modified_gmt":"2026-02-05T14:27:50","slug":"cambridge-university-and-the-lost-1-3-billion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/?p=3186","title":{"rendered":"Cambridge University and the Lost \u00a31.3 Billion"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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Here, we will track the real performance of Cambridge University’s endowment over time and isolate the impact of administrative spending growth above inflation. <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

We express values in constant 2025 pounds, taking inflation into account through CPI index, and we benchmark investment performance against the MSCI World Index.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We show a counterfactual scenario as to what the endowment would have been if administrative costs had been frozen in real terms at their 2011 level. The gap between the actual and counterfactual endowment values represents the cumulative opportunity cost of excess real administrative spending, showing how above inflation<\/em> <\/strong>administration growth compounds into materially lower long-term endowment value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under this scenario the endowment would now be GBP 1.3bn larger than  it is, or about 30% greater than the current level. Instead of growth, the real value of the endowment is more or less flat over the past decade. (For reference, Ms Rampton takes over as Registrary in 2017).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 1. Estimated impact of administrative spending above inflation on endowment value<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Year<\/th>Actual Endowment
(\u00a3bn, real 2025)<\/th>		Counterfactual Endowment
(\u00a3bn, admin spend inflation-capped)<\/th>		Cumulative Excess
Admin Spend (\u00a3bn, real)<\/th>		Implied Endowment
Shortfall (\u00a3bn)<\/th><\/tr>
2011<\/td>\u00a32.65<\/td>\u00a32.65<\/td>\u00a30.00<\/td>\u00a30.00<\/td><\/tr>
2015<\/td>\u00a33.98<\/td>\u00a34.03<\/td>\u00a30.11<\/td>\u00a30.06<\/td><\/tr>
2020<\/td>\u00a34.57<\/td>\u00a34.79<\/td>\u00a30.40<\/td>\u00a30.22<\/td><\/tr>
2025<\/td>\u00a34.40<\/td>\u00a35.46<\/td>\u00a30.95<\/td>\u00a31.06<\/td><\/tr>
2026 (projected)<\/td>\u00a34.42<\/td>\u00a35.70<\/td>\u00a30.95<\/td>\u00a31.28<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1 All figures are June 30 each year (date of reporting for CUEF). The 2026 figures are a projection, not audited outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The estimates for the “freeze” scenario assume that starting in 2012, admin budget would be indexed in line with inflation at its 2011 level. Any surplus would then be invested in the MSCI World Absolute returns  index with currency hedging to offset any variation in the GBP-USD  exchange rate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The 2026 counterfactual endowment is a conservative projection based on applying the observed 2025\u201326 real investment return of the actual endowment to the inflation-capped counterfactual path. No additional excess administrative spending beyond the 2025 cumulative level is assumed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By 2020, cumulative administrative spending above inflation is associated with an estimated \u00a30.22 bn reduction in the real value of the endowment relative to an inflation-capped spending path. By 2025, it is \u00a31.06bn. These are secure numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a like-for-like investment basis, the cumulative opportunity cost associated with above-inflation administrative spending is projected to be about\u00a0\u00a31.3 bn\u00a0in real terms by July 2026.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Here, we will track the real performance of Cambridge University’s endowment over time and isolate the impact of administrative spending growth above inflation. We express values in constant 2025 pounds, taking inflation into account through CPI index, and we benchmark investment performance against the MSCI World Index. We show a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3186","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3186","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3186"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3186\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3197,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3186\/revisions\/3197"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3186"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3186"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/21percent.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3186"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}